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RECONSIDERING SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION
Andrew J. Haile *
[I]n the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than
the State has always been maintained. 1
INTRODUCTION
In 1971, in the midst of the Vietnam War, the United States Supreme Court decided that to qualify as a conscientious objector
(“CO”) one must oppose all war, and not just a particular war. The
Court’s decision in Gillette v. United States turned on its interpretation of section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act. 2 Section
6(j) provided, in relevant part, that no person shall “be subject to
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.” 3 According to
the Court, “an objection involving a particular war rather than all
war would plainly not be covered by § 6(j).” 4 Consequently, the
Court construed the exemption from combatant military service in
section 6(j) not to extend to so-called “selective conscientious objectors” (“SCOs”). 5
* Associate Professor, Elon University School of Law. The author would like to thank
Sue Liemer and William A. Eagles for their feedback on drafts of this article. The author
also thanks Timaura Barfield for her outstanding work as a research assistant.
1. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
2. 401 U.S. 437, 441 (1971).
3. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, sec. 7, § 6(j), 81 Stat. 100,
104 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (Supp. III 2013–2016)).
4. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 443.
5. Id. (stating that the statutory language in section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act “can bear but one meaning; that conscientious scruples relating to war and military
service must amount to conscientious opposition to participating personally in any war and
all war”). The acronym “SCO” is used throughout this paper to refer to selective conscientious objectors (individuals who object to particular wars, but not all war, as a matter of
conscience). In contrast, the acronym “GCO” is used to mean general conscientious objectors
(individuals who object to all war as a matter of conscience).
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With no draft since the last man was inducted for service in Vietnam in 1973, 6 and no significant change to the language of section 6(j) since the Court’s interpretation in Gillette, 7 the issue of
selective conscientious objection has been seemingly settled for
more than forty years. The Supreme Court’s recent application of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 8 in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 9 however, raises the question of whether
selective conscientious objection might find new life under that
statute. This article explains the statutory and case law background relating to conscientious objection to war. It then examines
whether an issue that previously appeared to be settled law—that
SCOs may not receive an exemption from combat service, even if
they oppose a particular war based on religious grounds—should
be reconsidered as a result of RFRA’s enactment. The article concludes that a strong case exists for exemption from combat services
for SCOs.
I. STATUTORY AND CASE LAW BACKGROUND
The United States has had a long history of recognizing and protecting COs. 10 Federal conscription did not begin until the Civil
War, 11 but going back as far as the original colonies there were militias and conscription at the local level. 12 Several colonies provided
conscientious objection exemptions before independence 13 and

6. See Induction Statistics, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., https://www.sss.gov/About/HistoryAnd-Records/Induction-Statistics (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
7. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (Supp. I 1971–1972), with 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (Supp. III
2013–2016).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
9. 573 U.S. __, __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
10. Of course, COs have not always actually received the protections afforded under
law. Historical evidence exists of COs being physically tortured during earlier American
wars. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. KOHN, JAILED FOR PEACE: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN DRAFT
LAW VIOLATORS, 1658–1985, at 10 (1986) (stating that during the Revolutionary War “an
objector from North Carolina was whipped for refusing induction into the state militia:
‘Forty stripes were very heavily laid on, by three different persons, with a whip having nine
cords . . . .’” (alteration in original)).
11. Andrew M. Pauwels, Mandatory National Service: Creating Generations of Civic
Minded Citizens, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2597, 2606 (2012).
12. See Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, The American Militia and the Origin of Conscription:
A Reassessment, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 29, 33 (2001).
13. Massachusetts, for example, provided legal protections for COs as early as 1661. 1
SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION (Monograph No. 11, 1950). The colonies
of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania followed suit in 1673 and 1757, respectively. Id.
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some states included protections for COs in their state constitutions dating back to the time of independence. 14
In debates over the Bill of Rights, James Madison proposed that
the Second Amendment include a conscientious objection exemption and provide that a “well regulated militia, composed of the
body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no
person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.” 15
That language was ultimately rejected, with the exact basis for the
rejection unclear. At least one commentator has argued that the
omission of Madison’s proposed language resulted because the
“conference committee deliberating on these amendments felt that
such rights were implicit in the first amendment combined with
the general language of the [N]inth [A]mendment.” 16 Other commentators contend that the omission of a conscientious objection
exemption in the Bill of Rights “was made to protect rather than
restrict the rights of conscientious objectors,” since, as previously
mentioned, several of the states already included more protective
language in their statutes or constitutions. 17 Despite not expressly
including a conscientious objection exemption in the Bill of Rights,
the debates in Congress indicate a recognition of the need to allow
an exemption for those with a religious objection to combat service. 18 Until the Civil War, however, the treatment of COs remained a matter of state control.

14. For example, article VIII of the Declaration of Rights of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution provided:
That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of
life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion
towards the expence of that protection, and yield his personal service when
necessary, or an equivalent thereto: But no part of a man’s property can be
justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or
that of his legal representatives: Nor can any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent, nor are the people bound by any laws, but such as they have in like
manner assented to, for their common good.
PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VIII, reprinted in PA. LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE BUREAU, CONSTITUTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 233 (John H. Fertig ed., 1926).
15. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 778 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (emphasis added).
16. Theodore Hochstadt, The Right to Exemption from Military Service of a Conscientious Objector to a Particular War, 3 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (1967).
17. See Brief for Petitioner at 62–65, Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (No.
85) (citing language from the House debate over Madison’s Second Amendment proposal).
18. For example, Representative Boudinot stated while debating the Bill of Rights:
[W]hat justice can there be in compelling [COs] to bear arms, when, according
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A. The Conscientious Objection Exemption During the Civil War
With the need for substantial numbers of troops during the Civil
War, the federal government enacted its first conscription statute
in 1863. 19 That law, the Conscription Act of 1863, as originally enacted did not include an express conscientious objection exemption. 20 Instead, it allowed a general exemption for any person who
“furnish[ed] an acceptable substitute to take his place in the draft”
or who paid “such sum, not exceeding three hundred dollars, as the
Secretary [of War] may determine, for the procuration of such substitute.” 21 The conscription statute was amended less than a year
after its initial enactment to include an express conscientious objection provision. 22 The amended statute stated that:
[M]embers of religious denominations, who shall by oath or affirmation declare that they are conscientiously opposed to the bearing of
arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles
of faith and practice of said religious denominations, shall, when
drafted into the military service, be considered noncombatants, and
shall be assigned by the Secretary of War to duty in the hospitals, or
to the care of freedmen, or shall pay the sum of three hundred dollars
to such person as the Secretary of War shall designate to receive it, to
be applied to the benefit of the sick and wounded soldiers: Provided,
That no person shall be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of this
section unless his declaration of conscientious scruples against bearing arms shall be supported by satisfactory evidence that his deportment has been uniformly consistent with such declaration. 23

to their religious principles, they would rather die than use them? . . . I hope
that in establishing this Government, we may show the world that proper care
is taken that the Government may not interfere with the religious sentiments
of any person.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
19. A bill was introduced for the establishment of a federal conscription statute during
the War of 1812, but “[p]eace came before the bill was enacted.” Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366, 384–85 (1918). Likewise, there was no federal draft during the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) because the army comprised of state militias and volunteers “proved
adequate to carry the war to a successful conclusion.” Id. at 385.
20. The Confederacy also enacted a conscientious objection statute to exempt from combat service
all persons who have been and now are members of the society of Friends and
the association of Dunkards, Nazarenes and Mennonists, in regular membership in their respective denominations: Provided, Members of the society of
Friends, Nazarenes, Mennonists and Dunkards shall furnish substitutes or
pay a tax of five hundred dollars each into the public treasury.
Act of Oct. 11, 1862, ch. 45, Pub. Laws of the Confederate States of America.
21. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 731, 733.
22. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9.
23. Id.
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Thus, consistent with the earlier treatment of COs by several
states with respect to their militias, the federal government recognized the moral imperative of providing an exemption from combat
for those with religious objections.
The exemption statute in effect during the Civil War had two
notable aspects. First, the exemption applied to “members of religious denominations” that opposed the bearing of arms as a matter
of church doctrine. 24 In other words, the exemption applied to
members of traditional “peace churches”—Quakers, Mennonites,
and Brethren. 25 As we shall see, this limitation persisted through
World War I, but eventually the conscientious objection exemption
was extended by Congress and the Supreme Court to cover individuals who oppose war on “religious” grounds even if not members
of the traditionally recognized peace churches. 26
Second, the Civil War exemption statute referenced another issue that persisted in subsequent versions of conscientious objection
legislation—the need for an individualized determination of legitimacy with respect to the registrant’s application for CO status. As
stated in the Civil War-era statute, the declaration of a conscientious objection to bearing arms had to be “supported by satisfactory
evidence that [the applicant’s] deportment has been uniformly consistent with such declaration.” 27 Thus, since the inception of the
federal conscientious objection exemption, the government has undertaken an individualized inquiry into the validity of the prospective CO’s objection to war. 28 This type of inquiry continued to play
an essential role in determining the sincerity of a SCO’s claim for
exemption from combat service in subsequent times of war. Moreover, an examination of the sincerity of an CO applicant’s opposition to war is also at the heart of establishing a system capable of
successfully identifying SCOs.

24. Id.
25. Brief for the United States at 50, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (No.
50).
26. As explained below, the basis to qualify for the conscientious objection exemption
has arguably extended beyond “religious” scruples based on the Supreme Court’s decisions
in United States v. Seeger and Welsh v. United States. See infra notes 138–42 and accompanying text.
27. Act of Feb. 24, 1864 § 17, 13 Stat. at 9.
28. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 183–84.
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B. Exemption from Combat During World War I
The draft exemption statute in effect during World War I discontinued the option of avoiding combat service by finding a substitute
or paying money for a release, 29 but continued to rely on religious
denomination as a proxy for CO status. The Selective Draft Act of
1917 stated:
[N]othing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel
any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is
found to be a member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed or
principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and
whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in
accordance with the creed or principles of said religious organizations,
but no person so exempted shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant. 30

Despite the statutory reference to “member[s] of any well-recognized religious sect or organization,” however, President Woodrow
Wilson issued an executive order on March 20, 1918, 31 “defining
the policy of the President in regard to conscientious objectors.” 32
The executive order said that COs included not only persons “who
have . . . been certified by their local boards to be members of a
religious sect or organization” forbidding its members from participating in war in any form, but also those “who object to participating in war because of conscientious scruples but have failed to receive certificates as members of a religious sect or organization
from their local board.” 33 Thus, by executive order President Wilson broadened the combat exemption beyond just those who were
29.

Under the Selective Draft Act of 1917:
[N]o person liable to military service shall hereafter be permitted or allowed to
furnish a substitute for such service; nor shall any substitute be received, enlisted, or enrolled in the military service of the United States; and no such
person shall be permitted to escape such service or to be discharged therefrom
prior to the expiration of his term of service by the payment of money or any
other valuable thing whatsoever as consideration for his release from military
service or liability thereto.
Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, § 3, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917) (repealed 1956).
30. Id.
31. U.S. WAR DEP’T, STATEMENT CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS IN THE ARMY 18 (1919). Following this executive order, the Adjutant General of
the Army issued a memo stating that the Secretary of War considered “personal scruples
against war” to constitute “conscientious objections” and that individuals with such scruples
“should be treated in the same manner as other ‘conscientious objectors.’” Id. at 37.
32. Id. at 18.
33. Id. at 39.
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members of traditional peace churches. This recognized, at least
implicitly, that regardless of faith tradition, any individual might
hold religious beliefs against killing sufficient to justify exemption
from combat service.
The World War I exemption statute introduced for the first time
language requiring that the CO oppose “war in any form.” 34 This
language would carry forward to subsequent enactments of the exemption statute and would eventually become the statutory basis
for the Supreme Court’s decision during the Vietnam War holding
that only those who oppose all war, so called “general conscientious
objectors” (“GCOs”), rather than those who oppose a specific war,
SCOs, come within the scope of the exemption statute. 35
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the World
War I conscription statute in Arver v. United States. 36 In Arver, the
Court found the authority of Congress to enact a conscription statute in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power “to declare war” and “to raise and support armies.” 37 According to the Court, the “powers conferred by these
provisions like all other powers given [to the federal government
under the Constitution] carry with them . . . the [complementary]
authority ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying [such powers] into execution.’” 38 Under the Arver Court’s
constitutional construction, the power to “raise and support armies” necessarily includes the power to draft men to serve in those
armies. In response to the contention that Congress lacked the
power to “compel military service by a selective draft,” the Arver
Court stated that “[a]s the mind cannot conceive an army without
the men to compose it, on the face of the Constitution the objection
that it does not give power to provide for such men would seem to
be too frivolous for further notice.” 39

34. Selective Draft Act of 1917 § 4, 40 Stat. at 78. The conscientious objection statute
in place during the Civil War required that the individual “conscientiously oppose[] . . . the
bearing of arms,” rather than oppose war in any form. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13
Stat. 6, 9.
35. See infra Part I.F (discussing Gillette v. United States).
36. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). Arver is one of several consolidated cases heard by the Supreme Court addressing the constitutionality of the World War
I conscription statute. Id. at 366 n.1. Those cases are commonly referred to by the Court and
commentators as the Selective Draft Law Cases. This article will refer in text to the Selective
Draft Law Cases as “the Arver Case.”
37. Id. at 377 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 376–77.
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After giving a thorough discussion of the history of conscription
in the United States, the Court’s decision in Arver gave no analysis
to the argument that the exemption statute violated the First
Amendment’s Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses. Instead,
the Court simply stated:
[W]e pass without anything but statement the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise
thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the [Selective Service Act] . . . because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more. 40

Likewise, the Arver Court rejected a challenge to the World War I
conscription statute based on an argument of involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 41 Thus, in Arver,
the Supreme Court upheld the federal government’s authority to
conscript men to military service, relying largely on the broad language of the Constitution and a history of required military service, both in the states and abroad. 42
C. The Interbellum Immigration Cases
The next major conflict involving a draft was World War II, but
the Supreme Court decided a series of immigration cases involving
conscientious objection issues during the years between World War
I and World War II. In the first of those cases, United States v.
40. Id. at 389–90.
41. See id. at 390 (“[A]s we are unable to conceive . . . of the performance of his supreme
and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the
result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the
imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by
its mere statement.”).
42. See id. at 378–79 n.1 (citing dozens of other countries with statutes requiring mandatory military service). Note that state courts of both the Union and the Confederacy had
upheld the validity of conscription statutes during the Civil War, but the United States
Supreme Court had not considered the issue until the Arver case. See, e.g., In re Pille, 39
Ala. 459, 460 (1864); In re Emerson, 39 Ala. 437, 439 (1864); Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429, 504
(1863); Parker v. Kaughman, 34 Ga. 136, 152 (1865); Barber v. Irwin, 34 Ga. 27, 28, 72
(1864); Daly v. Harris, 33 Ga. 38, 54–55 (1864); Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347, 348, 371 (1862);
Simmons v. Miller, 40 Miss. 19, 25–27 (1864); Gatlin v. Walton, 60 N.C. (1 Win.) 333, 423
(1864); Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238, 239, 251–52 (1863); Ex parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 386,
405 (1862); Burroughs v. Peyton, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 470, 498 (1864).
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Schwimmer, 43 the Court considered whether a forty-nine-year-old,
Hungarian-born woman could become a United States citizen despite stating on her application for naturalized citizenship that she
“would not take up arms personally” in defense of the United
States because she was an “uncompromising pacifist.” 44 The Court
determined that this unwillingness to take up arms violated the
requirements for citizenship under the Naturalization Act of 1906,
which stated that:
[The applicant for naturalization] shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court . . . that he will support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the
same.
It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court . . . that
during that time [at least 5 years preceding the application] he has
behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles
of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good
order and happiness of the same. 45

According to the Schwimmer Court, “[t]hat it is the duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our government against all enemies
whenever necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the Constitution.” 46 Despite the fact that Ms. Schwimmer was female and
well over the draft age, her unwillingness to take up arms could
“lessen the willingness of [other] citizens to discharge their duty to
bear arms in the country’s defense,” 47 thereby detracting from the
strength and safety of the government. This, in turn, could hamper
the “good order and happiness” of the United States, contrary to
the requirements of the Naturalization Act. 48 In effect, the Court
found that those opposing war might serve as bad influences on
other citizens and therefore concluded that the Naturalization Act
denied citizenship to any person who refused to take up arms in
defense of the country, even if that person was a forty-nine-yearold woman. 49 As stated by the Court in Schwimmer:

43. 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
44. Id. at 647–48.
45. Id. at 646 (quoting Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 4, 34 Stat. 596,
597–98).
46. Id. at 650.
47. Id. at 648, 650.
48. Id. at 651–52.
49. See id. at 651.
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It is shown by official records and everywhere well known that during
the recent war [World War I] there were found among those who described themselves as pacifists and conscientious objectors many citizens—though happily a minute part of all—who were unwilling to
bear arms in that crisis and who refused to obey the laws of the United
States and the lawful commands of its officers and encouraged such
disobedience in others. Local boards found it necessary to issue a great
number of noncombatant certificates, and several thousand who were
called to camp made claim because of conscience for exemption from
any form of military service. Several hundred were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for offenses involving disobedience, desertion,
propaganda and sedition. It is obvious that the acts of such offenders
evidence a want of that attachment to the principles of the Constitution of which the applicant is required to give affirmative evidence by
the Naturalization Act. 50

Thus, according to the Court in Schwimmer, applicants for citizenship had to profess their willingness to bear arms in defense of
the country to attain citizenship, even if those applicants were of a
sex and age outside the scope of any conscription statute previously
(or subsequently) enacted in the United States. 51 The concern over
admitting COs to citizenship, even if those individuals would never
be drafted themselves, was not the applicant’s potential refusal to
provide combat service but instead the influence that the applicant
might have on others. 52 That influence could potentially result in
other citizens refusing to participate in the “reciprocal obligation”
of providing military service in exchange for a just and secure government. 53

50. Id. at 652–53.
51. See id. at 651–53.
52. See id. at 651 (“The influence of conscientious objectors against the use of military
force in defense of the principles of our Government is apt to be more detrimental than their
mere refusal to bear arms.”). Only Justice Holmes dissented from the decision, stating:
Some of her answers might excite popular prejudice, but if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree
with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. I think that we should adhere to that principle with regard to admission into, as well as to life within
this country. And recurring to the opinion that bars this applicant’s way, I
would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to make the country
what it is, that many citizens agree with the applicant’s belief and that I had
not supposed hitherto that we regretted our inability to expel them because
they believe more than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the
Mount.
Id. at 654–55 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 650 (majority opinion) (quoting Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378
(1918)).
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The holding of Schwimmer was affirmed two years later in
United States v. Macintosh, 54 where the applicant for citizenship
said that he was not a pacifist but that for him to fight in a war he
would have to “believe that the war was morally justified.” 55 While
the case was clearly “ruled in principle by United States v. Schwimmer” 56 and therefore a straightforward decision under very recent
precedent, the Court took the opportunity to discuss the extent of
the war power granted to Congress under the Constitution. The
Court quoted John Quincy Adams’s statement that Congress’s
power to wage war “is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional; but
it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection
of liberty, property and of life.” 57 Consistent with Adams’s view,
the Court explained that under Congress’s power to wage war
freedom of speech may, by act of Congress, be curtailed or denied so
that the morale of the people and the spirit of the army may not be
broken by seditious utterances; freedom of the press curtailed to preserve our military plans and movements from the knowledge of the
enemy; deserters and spies put to death without indictment or trial by
jury; ships and supplies requisitioned; property of alien enemies,
theretofore under the protection of the Constitution, seized without
process and converted to the public use without compensation and
without due process of law in the ordinary sense of that term; prices
of food and other necessities of life fixed or regulated; railways taken
over and operated by the government; and other drastic powers,
wholly inadmissible in time of peace, exercised to meet the emergencies of war. 58

The Macintosh Court explained that these examples illustrate
the breadth of Congress’s power with respect to waging war, and
further explained that any exemption from combat service was not
a matter of constitutional protection but was instead a result of
statutory grace by Congress. 59 And so, in Macintosh, the Court affirmed its earlier holding in Schwimmer and denied citizenship to
Mr. Macintosh based on his refusal to “leave the question of his
future military service to the wisdom of Congress where it belongs,
54. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931). That holding was later stated
by the Court as the “general rule—that an alien who refuses to bear arms will not be admitted to citizenship.” Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 63 (1946).
55. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 618.
56. Id. at 620.
57. Id. at 622.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 623 (“The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms
in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him.”).
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and where every native born or admitted citizen is obliged to leave
it.” 60 Macintosh’s insistence that “the question whether . . . war is
necessary or morally justified must, so far as his support is concerned, be conclusively determined by reference to his opinion” was
inconsistent with the Court’s understanding of Congress’s plenary
power to declare and wage war. 61 Effectively, the decision of
whether an individual must participate in a war was not to be left
to the individual, but instead determined by democratically elected
representatives in Congress. 62
The final decision in this series of immigration-related cases was
actually decided immediately following World War II in 1946. 63
Even so, the decision justifies a diversion from this chronological
examination of the treatment of COs, since it considers the same
issue as Schwimmer and Macintosh but reaches a different result.
In Girouard v. United States, 64 the applicant for citizenship was a
Seventh Day Adventist who stated that he was willing to provide
non-combat military service but, based on his religious beliefs, was
not willing to engage in combat service. 65 Despite his unwillingness
60. Id. at 624, 635. The Court made several other statements explaining the extent of
Congress’s power to wage war. For example, the Court quoted with approval an earlier decision stating:
[A]nd yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without
regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious
or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.
Id. at 624 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905)).
61. See id. at 622, 624.
62. See id. at 611. The Court decided a companion case, United States v. Bland, 283
U.S. 636 (1931), on the same day it decided Macintosh. In both cases, four justices, including
Justice Holmes, dissented. Bland, 283 U.S. at 637 (Hughes, C.J., Holmes, Brandeis, &
Stone, JJ., dissenting); Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 627 (Hughes, C.J., Holmes, Brandeis, &
Stone, JJ., dissenting). The dissent argued that the oath required for naturalization was
essentially identical to the oath required to hold public office, and that since COs who were
citizens were not precluded from holding public office, the oath must not prevent those seeking naturalization from becoming citizens. Bland, 283 U.S. at 637 (Hughes, J., dissenting);
Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 630 (Hughes, J., dissenting). As for the majority’s discussion of the
extensive power granted to Congress to declare and wage war, the dissent stated:
Much has been said of the paramount duty to the State, a duty to be recognized,
it is urged, even though it conflicts with convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the State exists within the domain of power, for government
may enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When one’s belief collides
with the power of the State, the latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral
power higher than the State has always been maintained.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 633 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
63. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 62.
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to take up arms, the Court found Mr. Girouard eligible for citizenship. 66 The Court reached this decision based primarily on its statutory interpretation of the Nationality Act of 1940. 67 According to
the Court, “[t]he oath [of allegiance] required of aliens [under the
Nationality Act] does not in terms require that they promise to
bear arms.” 68 This, of course, contradicted the Court’s previous decisions in Schwimmer and Macintosh. 69
The Girouard Court also discussed fundamental principles of
conscience in support of its decision to overturn these previous
cases:
The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an
effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of
the individual. The victory for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill
of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a moral
power higher than the State. Throughout the ages, men have suffered
death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority
of the State. Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment
is the product of that struggle. As we recently stated in United States
v. Ballard, “Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious
belief, is basic in a society of free men.” The test oath is abhorrent to
our tradition. Over the years, Congress has meticulously respected
that tradition and even in time of war has sought to accommodate the
military requirements to the religious scruples of the individual. We
do not believe that Congress intended to reverse that policy when it
came to draft the naturalization oath. Such an abrupt and radical departure from our traditions should not be implied. 70

In breaking with the holdings of Schwimmer and Macintosh, the
Girouard Court moved away from its earlier emphasis on Congress’s practically unlimited power to make war and focused instead on the individual’s right of conscience, acknowledging that
right as sometimes superior to the laws of the state. 71
66. See id. at 62, 70.
67. Id. at 69.
68. Id. at 64.
69. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931); United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644, 650 (1929).
70. Girouard, 328 U.S. at 68–69 (citation omitted).
71. See id. There was a dissent in Girouard, authored by Chief Justice Stone and joined
by Justices Reed and Frankfurter. Id. at 70 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed
with the majority’s statutory interpretation of the Nationality Act, pointing out that Congress had numerous opportunities to overturn the Court’s decisions in Schwimmer and Macintosh, but had failed to do so. See id. at 74 (“[F]or six successive Congresses, over a period
of more than a decade, there were continuously pending before Congress in one form or
another proposals to overturn the rulings in the three Supreme Court decisions in question
[Schwimmer, Macintosh, and Bland]. Congress declined to adopt these proposals after full
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That Girouard came immediately after the conclusion of World
War II may have influenced the Court’s decision in that the nation
had just completed an epic war and seen the successful implementation of a conscientious objection exemption system without any
notable negative impact on the country’s ability to field an army.
Consequently, the Court may have seen less need for the government to be able to force citizens into armed combat than in its earlier decisions, when the country had recently completed the less
“popular” World War I. And so, the Girouard decision seemed to
signal an increased tolerance for COs, borne perhaps of the relatively successful experience with conscientious objection claims
during World War II, as described below. The liberalized approach
toward conscientious objection claims signaled by the Court’s decision in Girouard would persist throughout the Korean War and
into the Vietnam War, at least until the Court’s consideration of
selective conscientious objection in 1971. Before examining conscientious objection law during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, first
consider the treatment of CO’s during World War II, which saw
two important lower court decisions construing the scope of the
conscientious objection statute.
D. Differing Approaches to the Conscientious Objection Statute
During World War II
In the run-up to United States involvement in World War II,
Congress enacted the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
The statute shifted away from any reference to denominational affiliation, 72 and instead stated: “Nothing contained in this Act shall
be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant
training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form.” 73
Despite the scale of World War II and the unprecedented number of individuals drafted into military service during the war,
there were no Supreme Court cases substantively construing the

hearings and after speeches on the floor advocating the change.”).
72. As discussed above, the draft acts in effect during the Civil War and World War I
expressly excluded from combat service members of denominations recognized as objecting
to war as a matter of creed or doctrine. See supra notes 23 and 30 and accompanying text.
73. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885,
889.
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exemption statute in effect during the war. 74 There were, however,
important and conflicting decisions by the Second Circuit and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals interpreting the statute. These
lower court decisions played influential roles in subsequent statutory enactments and decisions by the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Kauten, the Second Circuit construed the
meaning of the phrase “religious training and belief,” as used in
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. 75 The defendant in
the case, Mathias Kauten, had refused induction into the army
based on his opposition to war. 76 According to the hearing officer’s
report denying CO status to Mr. Kauten, “[t]here is no doubt that
the Registrant is sincerely opposed to war but this belief emanates
from personal philosophical conceptions arising out of his nature
and temperament, and which is to some extent, political.” 77 In support of the conclusion that Kauten’s objections to war were not
based on “religious training and belief,” the hearing officer found
that Kauten “admitted that he was an atheist or at least an agnostic,” and believed that “organized religion is detrimental and a hindrance to science.” 78
Judge Augustus Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, affirmed
the denial of CO status for Kauten. 79 Judge Hand stated that
Kauten’s “conviction that war is a futile means of righting wrongs
or of protecting the state, that it is not worth the sacrifice, that it
is waged for base ends, or is otherwise indefensible is not necessarily a ground of opposition based on ‘religious training and belief.’” 80 Despite Kauten’s sincerity in his opposition to war, that opposition was “based on philosophical and political considerations
applicable to this war rather than on ‘religious training and belief.’” 81 Thus, Judge Hand found that the statutory requirement of
74. There were cases interpreting the procedural aspects of the exemption statute. See,
e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 123 (1946) (holding that “[s]ubmission to induction would be satisfaction of the orders of the local boards, not a further step to obtain relief
from them”); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 558 (1944) (holding that the order and the
induction are administrative steps); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 554 (1944) (holding that defenses against criminal charges that a registrant had failed to obey a draft board
order could be not interposed until all administrative steps had been taken).
75. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1943).
76. Id. at 705.
77. Id. at 707 n.2.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 707–08.
80. Id. at 707.
81. Id. at 707–08.
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“religious training and belief” as the basis for the conscientious objection exemption meant that Congress had not intended to grant
the exemption to “the great number of persons who might object to
a particular war on philosophical or political grounds.” 82
In addition, although not relevant to the case (since Kauten had
stated an opposition to all war) and despite concluding that Kauten
was not entitled to a conscientious objection exemption due to his
lack of a religious basis for his opposition to war, Judge Hand, in
dictum, addressed the issue of selective conscientious objection. 83
On this point, Judge Hand stated that:
[The opposition to war] must ex vi termini be a general scruple against
“participation in war in any form” and not merely an objection to participation in this particular war. . . .
....
There is a distinction between a course of reasoning resulting in a
conviction that a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous and a
conscientious objection to participation in any war under any circumstances. The latter, and not the former, may be the basis of exemption
under the Act. The former is usually a political objection, while the
latter, we think, may justly be regarded as a response of the individual
to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is for many persons at the present time the equivalent of what has always been
thought a religious impulse. 84

Kauten was important for two reasons. First, because it held
that an applicant for CO status had to have a religious, rather than
philosophical or political, basis for his opposition to war in order to
be granted that status. 85 The Second Circuit’s view of what constituted a “religious” basis was relatively broad, however, with Judge
Hand stating that “[i]t is a belief finding expression in a conscience
which categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary
self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets.” 86 The court illustrated this definition of religious
belief by stating that “religious obligation forbade Socrates, even
in order to escape condemnation, to entreat his judges to acquit
him, because he believed that it was their sworn duty to decide
questions without favor to anyone and only according to law.” 87

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 708.
See id. at 707.
Id. at 707–08.
Id.
See id. at 708.
Id.
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Thus, although the court in Kauten limited the conscientious objection exemption to those with a “religious” basis for their objection to war, the court’s interpretation of what constituted a religious basis extended beyond traditional, deistic religions.
The second aspect of the Kauten decision that would carry significant influence in subsequent judicial decisions was the court’s
statement that opposition to a particular war is “usually a political
objection,” 88 and therefore would not qualify for the conscientious
objection exemption. While this statement was unnecessary for the
disposition of the Kauten case, it would influence the Supreme
Court’s eventual consideration of the selective conscientious objection issue during the Vietnam War. The resilience of the statement
by Judge Hand—that selective conscientious objection is usually
based on political considerations—is rather curious given both that
it was dictum and that Judge Hand provided no evidence or reasoned justification for his position.
The second World War II-era conscientious objection case that
would exert continuing influence was the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Berman v. United States. 89 In Berman, the mellifluously named
defendant, Herman Berman, argued to the Ninth Circuit that the
trial court “erroneously narrowed the meaning of the [exemption
statute] . . . by holding that the phrase in the section, by reason of
religious training and belief, limits the exemption to those conscientiously opposed to war as a belief related more or less definitely
to diety.” 90 Mr. Berman was an adamant socialist who sincerely
and consistently opposed war based on its “futility, its hopelessness, its inexpediency, [and] its cost in human lives.” 91 The court
found no reason to question the sincerity or strength of Berman’s
beliefs.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that Berman was not eligible for CO status based on the plain language of the exemption
statute. 92 According to the court in Berman:
[T]he expression “by reason of religious training and belief” is plain
language, and was written into the statute for the specific purpose of
88. Id.
89. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946). While the decision in Berman was issued after the
conclusion of World War II, the claim for CO status occurred during World War II. Id. at
379.
90. Id. at 378 (emphasis omitted).
91. Id. at 379.
92. Id. at 382.
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distinguishing between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an individual’s belief in his responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any
worldly one. 93

The Ninth Circuit in Berman distinguished between religious
belief, described as “belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,” and philosophy. 94
The court aptly explained the different nature of philosophical inquiry, as compared to religious belief, by stating that “[t]he intellectually satisfying Meditations of Marcus Aurelius do not suffice
for the boy in the fox hole, under fire. His philosophy is not called
upon in that agonizing hour. He goes direct to his God to bolster
his flagging strength and courage.” 95
Further, the Berman court distinguished its interpretation of
“religious training and belief” from the relatively broad understanding of the phrase by the Second Circuit in Kauten, stating
that no matter “how devotedly [an applicant for CO status] adheres
to [his philosophy of life], his philosophy and morals and social policy without the concept of deity cannot be said to be religion in the
sense of that term as it is used in the statute.” 96 To extend the exemption from combat to individuals like Berman would render the
phrase of “religious training and belief” to have “no practical effect
whatever.” 97 Consequently, despite the sincerity of Berman’s belief
opposing war, the Ninth Circuit held that “such belief was based
entirely upon a philosophical, social or political policy” and therefore did not “entitle him to exemption from military duty.” 98
The Kauten and Berman cases gave different interpretations of
the phrase, “religious training and belief,” as used in the exemption
statute. Under the Second Circuit’s 1943 interpretation in Kauten,
the phrase extended beyond traditional deistic religious beliefs, to
93. Id. at 380.
94. Id. at 381.
95. Id. at 380–81.
96. See id. at 381, 384.
97. Id. at 382.
98. Id. The dissent in Berman argued that the majority’s requirement of a deity as the
basis for religious belief would exclude from the military exemption members of the Taoist
and Buddhist faiths, as well as “all believers in Comte’s religion of humanism in which humanity is exalted into the throne occupied by a supreme being in monotheistic religions.”
Id. at 384 (Denman, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas addressed this issue directly in his concurrence in United States v. Seeger, where he expressly argued that the exemption statute
in effect at the time would apply to devout Buddhists. 380 U.S. 163, 193 (1965) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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include individuals, like Socrates, who held their beliefs with such
strength that they were willing to sacrifice their lives rather than
violate their principles. 99 The Ninth Circuit in Berman, on the
other hand, required a more traditional, deist-based belief to come
within the statute. 100 As explained below, the Ninth Circuit’s view
prevailed in Congress’s subsequent re-enactment of the exemption
statute, but during the Vietnam War era the Second Circuit’s approach won out, as the Supreme Court expanded the conscientious
objection exemption to include individuals with non-deistic, and
arguably even non-religious, beliefs in order to avoid First Amendment constitutional concerns with the conscientious objection statute.
E. Conscientious Objection After World War II
Following the Kauten and Berman decisions, Congress amended
the conscientious objection statute in 1948 to explain the meaning
of “religious training and belief.” 101 Section 6(j) of the Selective Service Act of 1948 (the “1948 Act”) incorporated language very similar to that in the Ninth Circuit’s Berman decision. 102 The 1948 Act
stated:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces
of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious
training and belief in this connection means an individual’s belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. 103

Thus, between the more expansive approach to interpreting “religious training and belief” taken by the Second Circuit in Kauten
and the narrower approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Berman
requiring belief in “God,” Congress opted for the narrower approach. 104 That legislative choice would eventually face judicial
scrutiny, however, with the Supreme Court finding that despite
the reference to a “Supreme Being” in the statute, Congress did not
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
Berman, 156 F.2d at 380.
Selective Service Act of 1948, 80 Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 609, 612–13.
Id.; Berman, 156 F.2d at 380.
Selective Service Act of 1948 § 6(j), 62 Stat. at 612–13 (emphasis added).
See id.; Berman, 156 F.2d at 380, 382; Kauten, 133 F.2d at 708.
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mean to foreclose conscientious objection based on more humanistic belief systems. 105
But before reaching that issue, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases involving members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith,
with several of these cases addressing procedural issues related to
the conscientious objection statute. 106 However, one case, Sicurella
v. United States, addressed an issue conceptually related to selective conscientious objection, which warrants discussion here. 107 In
Sicurella, the applicant for CO status stated that he could not
serve in the military because he was “already in the Army of Christ
Jesus serving as a soldier of Jehovah’s appointed Commander Jesus Christ.” 108 Sicurella responded to a question about the circumstances under which he believed in the use of force by stating that
he would use force
[o]nly in the interests of defending Kingdom Interests, our preaching
work, our meetings, our fellow brethren and sisters and our property
against attack. I (as well as all Jehovah’s Witnesses) defend those
when they are attacked and are forced to protect such interests and
scripturally so. Because in doing so we do not arm ourselves or carry
carnal weapons in anticipation of or in preparation for trouble or to
meet threats. 109

Based on these statements, the Appeal Board classified Sicurella
as eligible for combat service, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld his conviction for failing to submit to induction. 110 In
reviewing those decisions, the Supreme Court described the question presented in the case as whether “the willingness to use of
force in defense of Kingdom interests and brethren is sufficiently

105. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965) (discussed infra Part I.F).
106. See, e.g., Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 417 (1955) (holding that an applicant for CO status must be provided with a copy of the Justice Department’s recommendation and a reasonable opportunity to reply to that recommendation); Simmons v. United
States, 348 U.S. 397, 405–06 (1955) (holding that the Department of Justice had to provide
a FBI report to the applicant for CO status); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 380
(1955) (examining the standard of review for administrative decisions relating to applications for CO status). The Selective Service Act of 1948 was amended by the Universal Military Training and Service Act in 1951. Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch. 144,
sec. 1(a), § 1(a), 65 Stat. 75, 75 (1951). The 1951 Act did not change the language of section
6(j) setting out the standard for exemption from combat service. See id. ch. 144, sec. 1(q), §
6(j), 65 Stat. at 86.
107. 348 U.S. 385, 388 (1955).
108. Id. at 386.
109. Id. at 387.
110. Id. at 388 (citing United States v. Sicurella, 213 F.2d 911, 914 (1954)).
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inconsistent with petitioner’s claim as to justify the conclusion that
he fell short of being a conscientious objector.” 111
Answering this question, the Court stated that Sicurella “emphasized that the weapons of his warfare were spiritual, not carnal,” and therefore it was difficult for the Court “to believe that the
Congress had in mind this type of [spiritual warfare] when it said
the thrust of conscientious objection must go to ‘participation in
war in any form.’” 112 The Court further stated that:
The test is not whether the registrant is opposed to all war, but
whether he is opposed, on religious grounds, to participation in war.
As to theocratic war, petitioner’s willingness to fight on the orders of
Jehovah is tempered by the fact that, so far as we know, their history
records no such command since Biblical times and their theology does
not appear to contemplate one in the future. And although the Jehovah’s Witnesses may fight in the Armageddon, we are not able to
stretch our imagination to the point of believing that the yardstick of
the Congress includes within its measure such spiritual wars between
the powers of good and evil where the Jehovah’s Witnesses, if they
participate, will do so without carnal weapons.
We believe that Congress had in mind real shooting wars when it
referred to participation in war in any form—actual military conflicts
between nations of the earth in our time—wars with bombs and bullets, tanks, planes and rockets. 113

Consequently, the Court in Sicurella reversed the Seventh Circuit and found the applicant to come within the conscientious objection statute. 114 This decision has been argued to mean that one
need not oppose all instances of war to qualify as a CO, 115 though
the Supreme Court has not accepted this argument. In fact, the
Court’s Vietnam-era decision in Gillette disavowed the potential
support offered by Sicurella for recognition of selective conscientious objection.
F. Vietnam-Era Conscientious Objection Decisions
Following Sicurella, the next set of conscientious objection cases
to come before the Court arose in the context of the Vietnam War.
The first Vietnam-era case heard by the Court broadly construed

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 389.
Id. at 389–90.
Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 386–87, 392.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 50.
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the phrase “religious training and belief,” extending the term well
beyond its interpretation by the Ninth Circuit in Berman and even
beyond the meaning given the phrase by the Second Circuit in
Kauten. 116 In United States v. Seeger, the Supreme Court granted
CO status to three registrants, all of whom espoused beliefs outside
the traditional, orthodox religious model. 117 For example, one registrant expressed “skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God”
but stated that he maintained a “belief in and devotion to goodness
and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely
ethical creed.” 118 A second registrant said that he believed in “‘Godness’ which was ‘the Ultimate Cause for the fact of the Being of the
Universe.’” 119 Finally, the third registrant “was not a member of a
religious sect or organization” but said that “he felt it a violation of
his moral code to take human life and that he considered this belief
superior to his obligation to the state.” 120
The registrants challenged the constitutionality of the conscientious objection statute’s requirement that the objection be based on
“religious training and belief,” and particularly the statute’s definition of religious training and belief as “an individual’s belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code.” 121 According to the registrants, this definition violated both
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. 122
The Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional issues
raised by the registrants, however, instead interpreting the statutory language in such a way that all three registrants came within
the scope of the exemption statute. First, the Court noted that the
definition of religious training and belief set forth in the statute
was derived from Justice Hughes’s dissent in Macintosh, in which

116. Compare United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1965), with Berman v.
United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380, 382 (1946) (holding that a more deistic belief is necessary
to be exempt from military duty through conscientious believer status), and United States
v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (1943) (holding that a person does not necessarily need to
believe in a deity to be exempt from military duty through conscientious believer status).
117. 380 U.S. at 166, 168–69.
118. Id. at 166.
119. Id. at 168.
120. Id. at 169.
121. Id. at 165.
122. Id.
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he stated that “[t]he essence of religion is belief in a relation to God
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.” 123 This language had been incorporated into the 1948 Act,
which defined “religious training and belief” as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation.” 124 The Court in Seeger
claimed that Congress deliberately substituted “Supreme Being”
for “God” in the statute and intentionally “did not elaborate on the
form or nature of this higher authority which it chose to designate
as ‘Supreme Being,’” thereby indicating Congress’s intention to allow for an expansive definition of “religious training and belief.” 125
The Court also cited to the senate report of the 1948 Act. 126 The
senate report stated that the statute was meant to “re-enact ‘substantially the same provisions as were found’ in the 1940 Act,”
which referred only to “religious training and belief” and made no
mention of a Supreme Being. 127 Thus, according to the Court, “the
history of the [exemption statute] belies the notion that it was to
be restrictive in application and available only to those believing
in a traditional God.” 128
After explaining Congress’s intended breadth for the conscientious objection statute, the Court laid out a new standard for determining whether a registrant’s belief system qualified for an exemption from combat service. In the Court’s words, the test “is
essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy
the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in
God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption.” 129 The
Seeger Court further clarified that “the validity of what [an applicant for CO status] believes cannot be questioned.” 130 Rather, the
task of draft boards is to “decide whether the beliefs professed by a
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own
123. Id. at 175 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605,
633–34 (1981) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
124. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 609, 612–13 (emphasis added).
125. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 175–76.
126. Id. at 176.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 178. The Court resolved any perceived tension between Kauten and Berman
by stating that both cases held “in common the conclusion that exemption must be denied
to those whose beliefs are political, social or philosophical in nature, rather than religious.”
Id.
129. Id. at 184.
130. Id.
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scheme of things, religious.” 131 Finally, the Court distinguished the
“religious beliefs” of the applicants from “merely personal moral
code[s],” which by statute could not constitute the basis for a conscientious objection exemption. 132 According to the Court, a
“merely personal” moral code is one that “is not only personal but
which is the sole basis for the registrant’s belief and is in no way
related to a Supreme Being.” 133
Under this newly articulated approach, the Court found that all
three registrants qualified for the conscientious objection exemption. 134 There was no indication that their stated beliefs were insincere, and the Court found the beliefs of all three to relate in
some way to a Supreme Being, even if this relation was extremely
tenuous. 135 For example, with respect to Mr. Seeger, the Court said
that “[h]e did not disavow any belief ‘in a relation to a Supreme
Being’; indeed he stated that ‘the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.’” 136 This, according to the Court, qualified as “religious training and belief.” 137 Thus, in the Seeger case
the Court significantly extended the conscientious objection statute and untethered it from traditional, God-centered religious beliefs.
The Court moved even further away from requiring belief in deistic religion five years later in Welsh v. United States. 138 Although
the conscientious objection statute had been amended in 1967 after
Seeger to eliminate reference to a “Supreme Being,” 139 and Welsh

131. Id. at 185.
132. Id. at 185–86.
133. Id. at 186.
134. Id. at 187–88.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 187.
137. Id. at 176. The Seeger Court also stated that an applicant’s beliefs need not be “externally derived,” for example, through an established religious denomination. See id. at
186–87. Rather, the Court said that the conscientious exemption statute “does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs.” Id. at 186.
138. 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970).
139. The Military Selective Service Act of 1967 provided that:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term
“religious training and belief” does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, sec. 7, § 6(j), 81 Stat. 100, 104
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (Supp. III 2013–2016)).
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was decided by the Supreme Court in 1970, the statute in effect at
the time the petitioner in Welsh first applied for CO status still
contained the “Supreme Being” language applicable in Seeger.
Moreover, the facts of Welsh were substantially similar to those in
Seeger. 140 As in Seeger, the registrant in Welsh did not belong to
any organized religion, did not affirm or deny his belief in a “Supreme Being,” and grounded his objection to combat on deeply held
conscientious scruples that “killing in war was wrong, unethical,
and immoral.” 141
Despite the applicant’s lack of a traditional religious basis for
his objection to war, however, the Court found him to come within
the conscientious exemption statute. In particular, the Court
stated that under Seeger, the determination of whether an objection to war was “religious” within the meaning of the statute required only that the opposition to war “stem from the registrant’s
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong
and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions.” 142 In other words, the Welsh Court essentially
read the requirement for any connection to a higher power out of
the statute, stating,
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon
him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at
any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual “a
place parallel to that filled by . . . God” in traditionally religious persons. Because his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an individual is as much entitled to a “religious” conscientious objector exemption under § 6 (j) [of the CO statute] as is someone who derives
his conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious convictions. 143

As a result of Welsh, the Court put “moral” and “ethical” beliefs
on par with “religious” beliefs as possible bases to qualify for CO
status. 144 The Court also explained that the statutory exclusion
from CO status for those with “essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code” was not
meant to prevent those with “strong beliefs about our domestic and

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335.
Id. at 336–37.
Id. at 339–40.
Id. at 340 (first alteration in original).
Id. at 344.
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foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy” from qualifying for CO status. 145 According to the Welsh Court, the
two groups of registrants that obviously do fall within these exclusions
from the [conscientious objection] exemption are those whose beliefs
are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest at
all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely
upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency. 146

Given this extremely broad reading of the conscientious objection exemption statute, the Court found it to apply to Welsh, who
had stated that he “believe[d] the taking of life—anyone’s life—to
be morally wrong” and who the Court of Appeals had found to hold
this belief “with the strength of more traditional religious convictions.” 147 In fact, the Court did not find Welsh’s case to be a close
one, stating that “Welsh was clearly entitled to a conscientious objector exemption” since the exemption statute encompassed “all
those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or
religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed
themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.” 148
The evolution of the conscientious objection exemption to this
point has been one of continued expansion. 149 Through World War
I, the statutory exemption was granted based on membership in
historical peace churches, such as the Quakers, Mennonites, and
Brethren. 150 During World War II and the Korean War, the exemption expanded beyond this denominational approach and shifted to
an individualized inquiry into the sincerity of the registrant’s claim
for exemption, which had to be based on a God-centered religious
foundation. 151 With the Seeger and Welsh decisions, the exemption
was construed to cover not only traditional religious beliefs, but
also moral and ethical beliefs, even if those beliefs had no deistic
(Seeger) or even religious basis within the traditional sense of the

145. Id. at 342.
146. Id. at 342–43.
147. Id. at 343.
148. Id. at 343–44.
149. William D. Palmer, Time to Exorcise Another Ghost from the Vietnam War: Restructuring the In-Service Conscientious Objector Program, 140 MIL. L. REV. 179, 182–85 (1993)
(discussing the evolution of the in-service conscientious objection exemption).
150. Frances Heisler, The Law Versus the Conscientious Objector, 20 CHI. L. REV. 441,
441 (1953).
151. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965).
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word (Welsh). 152 This continued expansion of the exemption came
to a halt, however, with the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Gillette v. United States, in which the Court considered whether the
exemption statute covered SCOs. 153
The Gillette decision involved two SCOs. Guy Gillette had expressed his willingness to “participate in a war of national defense
or a war sponsored by the United Nations as a peace-keeping measure, but declared his opposition to American military operations in
Vietnam, which he characterized as ‘unjust.’” 154 Gillette’s refusal
to participate in the Vietnam War was, “in his words, ‘based on a
humanist approach to religion,’ and his personal decision concerning military service was guided by fundamental principles of conscience and deeply held views about the purpose and obligation of
human existence.” 155 The other SCO, Louis Negre, was a “devout
Catholic” who believed it was “his duty as a faithful Catholic to
discriminate between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars, and to forswear participation in the latter.” 156 Negre determined the Vietnam War to
be an unjust war according to Catholic teaching and was “firmly of
the view that any personal involvement in that war would contravene his conscience and ‘all that [he] had been taught in [his] religious training.’” 157
The Supreme Court in Gillette held that through section 6(j) of
the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (“1967 Act”),
Congress intended to exempt persons who oppose participating in all
war—“participation in war in any form”—and that persons who object
solely to participation in a particular war are not within the purview
of the exempting section, even though the latter objection may have
such roots in a claimant’s conscience and personality that it is “religious in character.” 158

Consequently, the Court concluded that neither Gillette nor Negre
came within the scope of the conscientious objection statute. 159 In
reaching this holding, the Court relied on its interpretation of the

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 184–85; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343–44.
401 U.S. 437, 439 (1971).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 440–41.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 463.
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express language of section 6(j), and rejected the petitioners’ argument that exempting GCOs while requiring service from SCOs violated both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
First Amendment. 160
Like the statutes in dispute in Seeger and Welsh, the 1967 Act
provided an exemption from service for those “conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.” 161 In construing this
provision, the Court rejected the petitioners’ contention that “in
any form” modified “participation” rather than “war.” In other
words, the petitioners argued that section 6(j) was intended to exempt from military service those individuals who objected to “participation in any form” in war, rather than those who objected to
participation in “war in any form.” 162 In response to this argument,
the Court stated that “[i]t matters little for present purposes
whether the words, ‘in any form,’ are read to modify ‘war’ or ‘participation.’” 163 According to the Court, this was because “conscientious scruples must implicate ‘war in any form,’ and an objection
involving a particular war rather than all war would plainly not be
covered by section 6(j).” 164
Moreover, the Court stated that “an objector must oppose ‘participation in war,’” and “[i]t would strain good sense to read this
phrase otherwise than to mean ‘participation in all war.’” 165 Thus,
despite the Supreme Court’s previous decision in Sicurella, where
the Court stated that “[t]he test is not whether the registrant is
opposed to all war, but whether he is opposed, on religious grounds,
to participation in war,” 166 in Gillette, the Court held that a registrant had to object to all war, not just a particular war, to come

160. Id. at 461.
161. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, sec. 7, § 6(j), 81 Stat. 100,
104 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (Supp. III 2013–2016)).
162. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 439–40, 475.
163. Id. at 443.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 390 (1955) (emphasis omitted). In explaining this statement, the Gillette Court distinguished the context in Sicurella from the situation in Gillette. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 446–47. In Sicurella, the registrant (a Jehovah’s
Witness) had stated that he opposed participation in secular wars but was not opposed to
participation in a “theocratic war” commanded by Jehovah. See id. at 446 (quoting Sicurella,
348 U.S. at 390). The Gillette Court characterized this willingness to fight in a theocratic
war as “highly abstract,” and said that section 6(j) was intended to consider a registrant’s
views with respect to “real shooting wars,” rather than abstract theocratic wars. Id. at 446–
47 (quoting Sicurella, 348 U.S. at 391). Gillette dealt with the petitioners’ willingness to
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within the scope of the conscientious objection exemption in section
6(j). 167
According to the Gillette Court, this interpretation of the statute
was consistent with both logic and history. The Court’s interpretation comported with logic because section 6(j) continued on to state
that “[a]ny person claiming exemption from combatant training
and service because of such conscientious objections . . . shall, if he
is inducted into the armed forces . . . be assigned to noncombatant
service as defined by the President.” 168 If section 6(j) were intended
to exempt those who conscientiously opposed “participation in any
form” in war, this assignment to noncombatant service would violate the very requirement for exemption, as the registrant would
be required to participate in a noncombatant role in war. 169 In addition, the Court reviewed earlier versions of the exemption statute, going as far back as the American Revolution, to find support
for the proposition that the conscientious objection exemption historically applied only to those who opposed all war, such as members of the traditional peace churches. 170
After concluding that the exemption statute applied only to
GCOs, not SCOs, the Court turned to the petitioners’ contention
that such an interpretation of the statute violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Taking
up the Establishment Clause challenge first, the Court stated that
“the Establishment Clause stands at least for the proposition that
when government activities touch on the religious sphere, they
must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral
in primary impact.” 171 With this standard in mind, the Court found
that “[s]ection 6(j) serves a number of valid purposes having noth-

fight in “secular wars,” and therefore Sicurella was deemed by the Gillette Court to be inapposite. Id.
167. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 447.
168. 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (Supp. I 1971–1972) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (Supp.
III 2013–2016)).
169. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 443 n.7.
170. See id. at 443–44 n.8. As an example, the Court noted that the Draft Act of 1917
“relieved from military service any person who belonged to ‘any well-recognized religious
sect or organization . . . whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate
in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation
therein.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Draft Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-12, § 4, 40
Stat. 76, 78 (1917)).
171. Id. at 450.
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ing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, religion, or cluster of religions.” 172 For example, the exemption statute prevented
the military from having to deal with the “hopelessness of converting a sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting
man.” 173 In other words, COs make ineffective soldiers, and the
exemption statute recognized that reality. The Court further recognized that exemption statutes “reflect[] as well the view that ‘in
the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the
state has always been maintained.’” 174 Thus, independent of sectarian affiliation or theological viewpoint, the 1967 Act’s exemption statute embodied the long-recognized tradition that in some
instances individual conscience should prevail over the dictates of
the state.
In addition to these “neutral and secular” reasons for any exemption, the Court stated that “valid neutral reasons exist for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war,” and not extending it to
objectors of particular wars. 175 Among these were the “Government’s need for manpower” and “the interest in maintaining a fair
system for determining ‘who serves when not all serve.’” 176 Allowing SCOs to come within the exemption would, according to the
Court, extend the exemption to “uncertain dimensions” and would
“involve a real danger of erratic or even discriminatory decisionmaking in administrative practice.” 177 The difficulty of distinguishing between religious opposition and political opposition to a particular war would be “considerable,” and “the belief that a particular war at a particular time is unjust is by its nature changeable
and subject to nullification by changing events.” 178
Furthermore, by limiting the exemption to GCOs, the Court
found that Congress had protected “the integrity of democratic decisionmaking against claims to individual noncompliance.” 179 The
Court recognized that allowing any exemption based on individual
conscience necessarily risks allowing the individual to become “a

172. Id. at 452.
173. Id. at 453.
174. Id. (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting)).
175. Id. at 454–56.
176. Id. at 455.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 455–56.
179. Id. at 458.

HAILE AC 524 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/5/2018 1:27 PM

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

861

law unto himself,” 180 and this risk is compounded by the administrative difficulty of local boards distinguishing the genuine CO to
a particular war from the dissenter who opposes the war on political grounds. 181 Based on these neutral justifications for limiting
the exemption to GCOs—concerns over manpower, the need for evenhandedness in administration of the exemption, and an interest
in maintaining centralized decision-making rather than allowing
each individual to become “a law unto himself”—the Court held
that section 6(j) did not violate the Establishment Clause. 182
Moving briefly to the challenge under the Free Exercise Clause,
the Court stated that the “Free Exercise Clause may condemn certain applications clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government’s valid aims.” 183 That said, the
Court found that the “incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners’ position are strictly justified by substantial governmental
interests that relate directly to the very impacts questioned.” 184 In
addition, the Court noted “the Government’s interest in procuring
the manpower necessary for military purposes, pursuant to the
constitutional grant of power to Congress to raise and support armies.” 185 Thus, the entirety of the Court’s free exercise analysis
amounted to a recognition of the government’s substantial interest
in ensuring sufficient manpower to raise and support an army.
In summary, the decision in Gillette limited the scope of the conscientious objection exemption based on a statutory interpretation
of section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act. The decision
also rejected the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause

180. The phrase “a law unto himself” was first used by the Supreme Court in Reynolds
v. United States where the Court considered religious objections to the law against polygamy. 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878). The Court stated that:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of
the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed.
Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief?
To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.
Id.
181. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 459–60.
182. See id. at 460.
183. Id. at 462.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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challenges to the conscientious objection statute in light of the neutral bases cited by the Court for distinguishing between GCOs and
SCOs, as well as the government’s substantial interest in maintaining the distinction. As explained below, RFRA renders the statutory interpretation in Gillette irrelevant and requires application
of a more rigorous standard of review than the standard applied by
the Gillette Court to uphold the disparate treatment of GCOs and
SCOs. Based on this more rigorous standard, if the Court were to
consider the question of selective conscientious objection today, it
would most likely reach a different result than it did in Gillette. An
analysis of a selective conscientious objection claim under RFRA is
set forth below.
II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
Congress enacted RFRA in 1993, 186 in response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. 187 In Smith, the
Court rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge to Oregon’s decision not to grant unemployment compensation benefits to individuals who were terminated from their jobs due to their use of an
illegal drug (peyote) in a religious ceremony. 188 The Court held that
the traditional strict scrutiny standard (compelling interest and
least restrictive means) did not apply to neutral, generally applicable laws, such as Oregon’s drug or unemployment compensation
laws, even if those laws incidentally impacted a person’s ability to
engage in religious practices. 189
In explaining the scope of the Free Exercise Clause as it relates
to generally applicable laws not intentionally directed at religious
practices, the Court stated:
It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for
example, as “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” by those citizens who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than
it is to regard the same tax as “abridging the freedom . . . of the press”

186. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012)).
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4). See generally Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874
(1989) (examining whether “the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the
State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general
criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny unemployment
benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use”).
188. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
189. Id. at 882.
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of those publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of
staying in business. It is a permissible reading of the text [of the Free
Exercise Clause], in the one case as in the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is
not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has
not been offended. 190

According to the Smith Court, to hold otherwise would “make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself.” 191
Congress, however, did not share that same concern, and enacted RFRA three years after Smith. 192 In RFRA, Congress stated
that the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability.” 193 Under the statute, if the government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion through a rule of general applicability, that person is entitled to an exemption from the
rule unless the government “demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.” 194 The definition of “exercise of religion” under RFRA originally made reference to the First
Amendment. 195 In 2000, however, Congress amended the definition to “effect a complete separation from First Amendment case
law,” 196 and defined the “exercise of religion” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system
of religious belief.” 197 Moreover, Congress mandated that this concept “be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter
and the Constitution.” 198 Thus, Congress has manifested a clear
190. Id. at 878 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1989)).
191. Id. at 879.
192. See Scott Bomboy, What Is RFRA and Why Do We Care?, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June
30, 2014), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/what-is-rfra-and-why-do-we-care/.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012).
194. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
195. See id. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994) (defining “exercise of religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First Amendment”).
196. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761–62
(2014).
197. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2762; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).
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intention to afford broad protections for the exercise of religion under RFRA.
The breadth of protection under RFRA was illustrated by the
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., in which the Court determined that under RFRA, for-profit
corporations were protected from a mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) that would have required the
corporations to provide health insurance with certain types of contraceptive care for their employees. 199 The owners of the closely
held corporations in the case argued that the contraception mandate substantially burdened their (and their corporations’) exercise
of religion because it forced them either to provide abortifacient
medical care in violation of their religious beliefs or face substantial financial penalties. 200 The Hobby Lobby majority found that
“[b]ecause the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay an enormous sum of money—as much as $475 million per year in the case
of Hobby Lobby—if they insist on providing insurance coverage in
accordance with their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden on those beliefs.” 201
Because the Court determined that the contraceptive mandate
substantially burdened the exercise of religion, the government
agency responsible for administering the mandate had to show
that the mandate was both in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest. 202 According to the Court,
RFRA “requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged
law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise
of religion is being substantially burdened.” 203 This meant that the
Court was required to “loo[k] beyond broadly formulated interests,”
such as “public health” and “gender equality” in the case of the contraceptive mandate, and instead to “look to the marginal interest
in enforcing the [challenged law] in these cases.” 204 After explaining that RFRA requires a “focused inquiry” into the governmental

199. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2765.
200. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2775–76.
201. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
203. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006)).
204. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431).
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interest involved rather than broad statements of general interests, however, the Court found it “unnecessary to adjudicate this
issue” because the government had failed to meet the “least-restrictive-means standard.” 205 As a result, the determination of whether
a compelling governmental interest existed was irrelevant to the
ultimate disposition of the case. 206
With respect to the least-restrictive-means analysis, the Court
stated that the standard is “exceptionally demanding.” 207 The
standard was not met by the government in Hobby Lobby because
a regulatory accommodation from providing the objectionable contraceptive methods already existed for non-profit organizations
with religious objections. Under that accommodation, an objecting
organization could “self-certify that it opposes providing coverage
for particular contraceptive services.” 208 After self-certification,
the organization’s insurance issuer or third-party administrator [was
required to] “[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive coverage from the
group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the
group health plan” and “[p]rovide separate payments for any contraceptive services required to be covered” without imposing “any costsharing requirements . . . on the eligible organization, the group
health plan, or plan participants or beneficiaries.” 209

The Court found that this alternative system for contraceptive coverage could extend to for-profit organizations with religious objections, and therefore the contraceptive mandate did not constitute
the least restrictive means of accomplishing the government’s interest in providing contraceptive care to employees of for-profit organizations. 210 In short, a system existed that allowed the Government to achieve its goal of contraceptive care coverage without
requiring that companies with religious objections pay for that coverage.
After concluding that the government had failed to carry its
least-restrictive-means burden, the Hobby Lobby majority addressed a concern expressed by the dissent that “a ruling in favor
of the objecting parties in these cases will lead to a flood of religious
205. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2779–80.
206. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
207. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
208. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
209. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (first
quoting 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2) (2013); then quoting 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(c)(2)
(2015)).
210. See id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
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objections regarding a wide variety of medical procedures and
drugs, such as vaccinations and blood transfusions.” 211 In response
to this concern, the majority stated that the government had “made
no effort to substantiate this prediction” and had not “provided evidence that any significant number of employers sought exemption,
on religious grounds, from any of ACA’s coverage requirements
other than the contraceptive mandate.” 212 Thus, the burden was on
the government to show empirical evidence of the “floodgates” concern it raised, and the government had failed to meet that burden.
III. APPLYING RFRA TO SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
As described above, RFRA requires the person challenging a
“neutral” law, such as the contraceptive mandate in Hobby Lobby
or the draft act in the case of a CO, to demonstrate that the law
imposes a “substantial burden” on that person’s exercise of religion. 213 If the person challenging the law can make that showing,
“that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule unless the
Government ‘demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’” 214 According to the Supreme
Court, “RFRA was designed to provide very broad protection for
religious liberty. By enacting RFRA, Congress went far beyond
what this Court has held is constitutionally required.” 215 As explained below, the draft act places a substantial burden on a SCO’s
exercise of religion, thereby triggering strict scrutiny review. While
requiring military service of SCOs may or may not constitute a
compelling state interest, forcing them into combat is not the least
restrictive means of accomplishing that interest.
A. Substantial Burden on the Exercise of Religion
In the case of a SCO, the statutory penalty for refusing induction
into the military is imprisonment for up to five years and a fine of
211. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
212. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2783.
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012) (“Government shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”).
According to Congress, “laws [that are] ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.” Id.
214. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)).
215. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2767.
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up to $10,000. 216 While the potential financial penalty is significantly less than the amount at issue in Hobby Lobby, 217 the potential for a relatively lengthy prison sentence would almost certainly
constitute a substantial burden.
Perhaps more important, however, courts and commentators
have recognized the essential interest in being permitted to follow
one’s conscience with respect to participation in war. Compelling
combat service in violation of the mandates of conscience substantially burdens that interest and violates the opportunity for selfdetermination that underlies our very identity as Americans. As
explained by Justice Douglas in Girouard:
The victory for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a moral power higher
than the State. Throughout the ages, men have suffered death rather
than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the State.
Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product of that struggle. 218

The jurist with arguably the greatest understanding of the burden of compulsory service on the CO was Chief Justice Harlan
Stone. During World War I (while serving as Dean of Columbia
Law School and prior to joining the Supreme Court), then-Dean
Stone served as a member of the Board of Inquiry, which heard
appeals of CO claims. 219 After the war, then-Dean Stone wrote an
essay in the Columbia University Quarterly, describing his experience on the Board. Though harshly critical of some of the COs he
216. 50 U.S.C. § 3811(a) (Supp. III 2013–2016) (“Any . . . person charged as herein provided with the duty of carrying out any of the provisions of this chapter, or the rules or
regulations made or directions given thereunder, who shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duty, . . . shall, upon conviction in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not
more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”).
217. As previously noted, the fines potentially applicable in Hobby Lobby were, at least
for one of the companies involved in the case, approximately $475 million per year. Hobby
Lobby, 573 U.S. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
218. United States v. Girouard, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946). Interestingly, despite this statement there is substantial support for the position that it is only through statutory protections afforded by Congress, not through constitutional protections, that one may assert an
exemption from combatant military service. In United States v. Macintosh, Chief Justice
Hughes “enunciated the rationale behind the long recognition of conscientious objection to
participation in war accorded by Congress in our various conscription laws when he declared
that ‘in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the State has always
been maintained.’” United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 169–70 (quoting United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 663 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)).
219. Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1132 (2014); Stone, Harlan Fiske, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/
history/judges/stone-harlan-fiske (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
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encountered, 220 then-Dean Stone elegantly explained the purpose
of the conscientious objection exemption as follows:
[B]oth morals and sound policy require that the state should not violate the conscience of the individual. All our history gives confirmation
to the view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value
which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state. So
deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of man’s
moral and spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation
of the state should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned
whether the state which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose
it by the process. 221

Moreover, then-Dean Stone noted the particularly burdensome
imposition resulting from compulsory military service because
such service requires the individual to take action—rather than to
refrain from acting. Then-Dean Stone wrote:
Viewed in its practical aspects, however, there may be and probably
is a very radical distinction between compelling a citizen to refrain
from acts which he regards as moral but which the majority of his
fellow citizens and the law regard as immoral or unwholesome to the
life of the state on the one hand, and compelling him on the other to
do affirmative acts which he regards as unconscientious and immoral.
The action of the state in compelling the citizen to refrain from doing
an act which he regards as moral and conscientious does not in most
instances which are likely to occur do violence to his conscience; but
conscience is violated if he is coerced into doing an act which is opposed to his deepest convictions of right and wrong. The traditional
view of the common law that right motives are no defense for crime

220.

In discussing some of the COs he encountered, then-Dean Stone stated:
Their average mentality was low. Most of them had little comprehension of the
great issues involved in the war, or of what the consequences would be if it
were lost to America. . . . [A]ll in all they presented a depressing example of
dense ignorance of what was going on in the world, and stolid indifference to
those moral and political questions which were so profoundly stirring the
minds and hearts of their fellow countrymen.
Harlan F. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. U. Q. 253, 260 (1919). The exception to then-Dean Stone’s harsh words were the Quakers he encountered. Of this group he
stated:
[T]he Quakers produced a favorable impression by their high intelligence and
their evident desire to render service to the country in its time of need so far
as possible within the limits of their religious convictions. . . . They were eager
to accept the onerous and sometimes dangerous service in the Quaker Reconstruction Unit in Europe, and they have the impression that the problem of the
government would not have been serious had it had to deal only with the cases
of Quakers.
Id.
221. Id. at 269.
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and should not stay the hand of the law gives very little clue, therefore, to the sound method of dealing with the conscientious objector to
war, in the realm of either morals or policy. However rigorous the
state may be in repressing the commission of acts which are regarded
as injurious to the state, it may well stay its hand before it compels
the commission of acts which violate the conscience. 222

The distinction identified by then-Dean Stone in his essay was
subsequently recognized by a federal district court in assessing the
exemption claim of a SCO during the Vietnam War and prior to the
Supreme Court’s issuance of the Gillette decision:
[I]n the instant case defendant is not being restrained from doing an
affirmative act, rather, the Selective Service Act is commanding him
to perform an affirmative act—participation in a war which his conscience tells him is unjust. This distinction was articulated by Chief
Justice Stone thusly: “[C]ompelling the citizen to refrain from doing
an act which he regards as moral and conscientious does not do violence to his conscience; but his conscience is violated if he is coerced
into doing an act which is opposed to his deepest convictions of right
and wrong.” If the Selective Service statute does not exempt from its
command the Catholic selective objector, then it must run afoul of this
prohibition against the State commanding one to act against his conscience. 223

The district court in that case went on to explain in stark terms
the choice confronted by the SCO:
In the case before the court the statute forces defendant McFadden to
choose between following the precepts of his religion and going to jail
or abandoning those precepts in order to avoid jail. Indeed, the case of
defendant McFadden is stronger than Sherbert’s [a petitioner in an
earlier First Amendment case], for not only is he faced with jail, but if
he abandons his conscience he will be put in the position of possibly
violating the fundamental precept of his religious belief—the killing
of another human being in the cause of an unjust war. 224

Despite the substantial difference between the financial penalty
at stake in Hobby Lobby and the fine triggered by a violation of the
draft law, the burden imposed by forced military service in violation of one’s religious beliefs is profound. There is the potential loss
of liberty, with the statute allowing for up to a five-year prison
term. 225 To avoid prison, the CO would have to violate his religious
222. Id. at 268–69.
223. United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502, 505–06 (N.D. Cal. 1970), vacated,
401 U.S. 1006 (1971) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting
Stone, supra note 220, at 268).
224. Id. at 506.
225. 50 U.S.C. § 3811(a) (Supp. III 2013–2016).
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faith. Moreover, forced military service would not just require the
CO to refrain from action that he believes to be moral or ethical,
but would potentially compel him to act in a way contrary to
strongly held religious beliefs. For these reasons, forcing a SCO to
participate in combatant military service places a substantial burden on the SCO’s exercise of religion.
This begs the question, of course, of whether selective conscientious objection is in fact an exercise of religion or, as contended by
Justice Hand’s opinion in Kauten, it is more likely to be simply a
political position. 226 The answer to this question must turn on the
individual registrant involved, but several Christian denominations recognize selective conscientious objection through a theory
known as the “just war doctrine.” Under the just war doctrine as
explained by the Catholic Church, for example:
A war of aggression is intrinsically immoral. In the tragic case where
such a war breaks out, leaders of the State that has been attacked
have the right and the duty to organize a defence even using the force
of arms. To be licit, the use of force must correspond to certain strict
conditions: “the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or
community of nations must be lasting, grave and certain; all other
means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical
or ineffective; there must be serious prospects of success; the use of
arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be
eliminated. The power of modern means of destruction weighs very
heavily in evaluating this condition. These are the traditional elements enumerated in what is called the ‘just war’ doctrine. The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common
good.” 227

Catholic doctrine further expressly recognizes not only general
conscientious objection, but also selective conscientious objection
and calls for all who refuse to participate in war due to conscientious scruples to accept alternative forms of service in place of military service:
Conscientious objectors who, out of principle, refuse military service
in those cases where it is obligatory because their conscience rejects

226. See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943) (stating that objection
to particular wars, and not wars in general, “is usually a political objection, while the latter,
we think, may justly be regarded as a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call
it conscience or God”).
227. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR PEACE & JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE
OF THE CHURCH 217–18 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH para. 2309, at 556 (Liberia Editrice Vaticana 2d ed. 2016)).
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any kind of recourse to the use of force or because they are opposed to
the participation in a particular conflict, must be open to accepting
alternative forms of service. “It seems just that laws should make humane provision for the case of conscientious objectors who refuse to
carry arms, provided they accept some other form of community service.” 228

Other faith traditions that have recognized selective conscientious objection include, but are not limited to, the Methodist
Church, 229 the United Church of Christ, 230 the United Presbyterian
Church, the American Baptist Church, and the World Council of
Churches. 231 Thus, in several Christian denominations selective
conscientious objection is recognized as a part of the denomination’s doctrinal beliefs and constitutes the “exercise of religion” by
adherents to these faith traditions.
B. The Compelling Interest Analysis
Once the CO establishes that required combatant service places
a substantial burden on his exercise of religion, the onus shifts to
the government to show that the burden to the CO is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. 232 The first consideration in this analysis is to identify the purported compelling
interest furthered by the statute. As explained above, Hobby Lobby
makes clear that RFRA requires a “focused inquiry” into the purported interest and rejects interests “couched in very broad terms,”
228. Id. at 219 (emphasis omitted) (quoting SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL,
PASTORAL CONSTITUTION GAUDIUM ET SPES para. 79 (1966)).
229. In October 1969, the Board of Christian Social Concerns of the United Methodist
Church issued a statement which said, in part, “[W]e ask that all those who conscientiously
object to preparation for or participation in any specific war or all wars be granted legal
recognition and assigned to appropriate civilian service.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17,
at 51 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
230. In June 1967, the General Synod of the United Church of Christ passed the following pronouncement: “Therefore be it resolved that the General Synod of the United Church
of Christ recognize the right of conscientious objection to participation in a particular war
or in war waged under particular circumstances, as well as the right of conscientious objection to participation in war as such.” Id. at 52.
231. In July 1968, the World Council of Churches meeting in Uppsala, Sweden, voted
almost unanimously in favor of the following resolution: “[P]rotection of conscience demands
that the churches should give spiritual care and support not only to those serving in armed
forces, but also to those who, especially in the light of the nature of modern warfare, object
to participation in particular wars they feel bound in conscience to oppose.” Id. (quoting
Edward B. Fiske, Churches Uphold Right to Oppose Particular Wars, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
1968, at 10).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
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such as, in the context of the contraceptive mandate at issue in
Hobby Lobby, “public health” or “gender equality.” 233 According to
the Court in Hobby Lobby, RFRA
“requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest
test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” This requires [the Court] to “loo[k] beyond broadly formulated interests” and to “scrutiniz[e] the asserted
harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants”—in other words, to look to the marginal interest in enforcing the
contraceptive mandate in these cases. 234

One could read this statement to support an extremely narrow
compelling interest inquiry, focusing entirely on the individual
claiming a substantial burden on his exercise of religion. In Hobby
Lobby, for example, a statement of the compelling interest question
justified by the Court’s narrow approach set forth in the abovequoted language would be whether the government has a compelling interest in requiring that Hobby Lobby and the two other petitioning corporations involved in the case provide insurance coverage for the four challenged contraceptive methods at issue. The
analog in a SCO case would be whether the government has a compelling interest in requiring that a particular SCO serve in combat.
Framing the question this way almost answers itself, as the “marginal interest” 235 of forcing an individual CO into combat is practically non-existent, given the number of individuals who serve in
the military during war. 236
Ultimately, the Court’s statement of the alleged compelling interest in Hobby Lobby was slightly broader than might have been
expected under the “focused inquiry” described above. In essentially bypassing the compelling interest analysis to reach the least
restrictive means analysis on which the case turned, the Court said
that it would “assume that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free
access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling
within the meaning of RFRA.” 237 Notably, the Court did not say
233. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014).
234. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006)).
235. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
236. For example, 4.7 million United States service members served in the military during World War I, 16.1 million during World War II, and 8.7 million during the Vietnam War.
See America’s Wars, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.va.gov/opa/publications
/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
237. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (emphasis added).
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that the interest at stake was guaranteeing the provision of the
four challenged contraceptive methods by the particular petitioners
in the case. Thus, the Court appeared to move away from the highly
individualized inquiry that it had seemingly espoused earlier in
the case. Equally notable, the Court expressly rejected framing the
interest at stake in the broadest possible terms, such as “public
health” and “gender equality.” 238 Thus, the Court seemed to find a
middle ground in identifying the interest at stake—not focusing on
the particular individual involved in the case, but also not accepting exceptionally sweeping interests such as “public health” and
“gender equality.”
Based on its statements in Hobby Lobby, it appears that the
Court would frame the interest at issue in a SCO case under RFRA
not in terms as narrow as whether the government has a compelling interest in requiring an individual SCO to serve in combat or
in terms as broad as whether the government has a compelling interest in its ability to establish an effective fighting force. Rather,
the relevant inquiry appears to be whether the government has a
compelling interest in requiring SCOs to serve in combat. Determining whether this interest constitutes a “compelling government
interest” requires the examination of the various justifications for
the Court’s decision in Gillette and assessing whether these justifications amount to a “compelling interest.”
In Gillette, the Supreme Court identified various interests in
support of its decision not to recognize selective conscientious objection. These included: manpower concerns, questions about fairness, and the need to protect the integrity of democratic decisionmaking. 239 As mentioned earlier, the Court did not apply the traditional strict scrutiny standard in Gillette, and consequently did
not characterize any of these interests as “compelling.” Rather, in
upholding the distinction between GCOs and SCOs, the Court
stated that the “incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners’
position are strictly justified by substantial governmental interests
that relate directly to the very impacts questioned.” 240 Whether
these interests amount to “compelling interests” sufficient to justify the substantial burden on the exercise of religion required by
RFRA is explored below. As in Hobby Lobby, however, the compelling interest inquiry may ultimately prove irrelevant because the
238.
239.
240.

Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971).
Id. at 462 (emphasis added).

HAILE AC 524 (DO NOT DELETE)

4/5/2018 1:27 PM

874

[Vol. 52:831

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

interests underlying the draft act may be achieved by less restrictive means than forcing SCOs into combat.
1. Manpower Considerations
With respect to the issue of manpower, the Gillette Court did not
cite any empirical data or even provide any substantive discussion
of this concern. Rather, the Court simply stated that the government has an “interest in procuring the manpower necessary for
military purposes, pursuant to the constitutional grant of power to
Congress to raise and support armies.” 241 Despite the lack of data
or analysis provided, presumably, the concern over manpower is
that broadening the exemption from combat service to include
SCOs would hinder the government’s ability to raise a force large
enough to support military operations. This seems dubious, however, in light of historical experience.
From World War I through the Vietnam War, the percentage of
draft registrants who were exempted from military service due to
conscientious objection has never exceeded even one quarter of one
percent of the total registrants:
Table 1 – Conscientious Objectors by Conflict 242
Conflict

WWI 243
WWII 244
Korea (6/30/52) 245
Vietnam (1971) 246

Number of
Conscientious Objectors

Number of
Registrants

72,000

34,507,000

0.21%

8,000

13,225,000

0.06%

37,000

16,098,000

0.23%

(rounded to nearest
thousand)
4,000

(rounded to nearest
thousand)
23,456,000

% of
COs
0.02%

241. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). The only other mention of manpower concerns in
the majority opinion were in the context of the Court’s discussion of fairness, when the Court
stated that “[a]part from the Government’s need for manpower, perhaps the central interest
involved in the administration of conscription laws is the interest in maintaining a fair system for determining ‘who serves when not all serve.’” Id. at 455.
242. COs classified as I-O did not serve in the military but were required to perform
alternative service of “national importance.” Selective Service and Training Act of 1940,
Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889. COs classified as I-A-O performed non-combat
military service. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.2, 1622.14 (1962). The figures in this table and in Table
2 show only those individuals classified as I-O.
243. See Hochstadt, supra note 16, at 60.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1972, at 264 tbl.432 (1972) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1972].
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Based on historical precedent, even with the addition of SCOs,
it is unlikely that the number of individuals exempted from military service would increase significantly. Two historical instances
support this position. First, after the Supreme Court broadened
the conscientious objection exemption in 1965 in Seeger 247 and then
again in 1970 in Welsh, 248 the number of CO claims increased only
negligibly, never exceeding even one quarter of one percent of total
registrants:
Table 2 – Conscientious Objectors by Year 249
Year

Number of
Conscientious Objectors

Number of Registrants
(18 ½ to 26 years old)

% of
COs

11,000

17,967,000

0.06%

9,000

18,971,000

0.05%

11,000

19,901,000

0.06%

13,000

20,829,000

0.06%

16,000

21,785,000

0.07%

28,000

22,705,000

0.12%

37,000

16,098,000

0.23%

10,000

15,012,000

0.06%

9,000

14,840,000

0.06%

(rounded to nearest
thousand)

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

(rounded to nearest
thousand)

In addition to the relatively minor impact resulting from the extension of the conscientious objection exception in Seeger and later
in Welsh, the British experience during World War II provides further support that the inclusion of SCOs would not result in a shortage of available manpower. Despite allowing for selective conscientious objection during the war, the British found that “the number
of all COs, including SCOs, was only about 1 in 125 men registering.” 250 According to one commentator, out of approximately 5.9
million “men in uniform” for Great Britain in World War II, only
247.
248.
249.

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965).
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343–44 (1970); see supra Part I.F.
Figures for years 1965–1967 come from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1968, at 262 tbl.383 (1968). Figures for 1968–1969 come from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1970, at 262 tbl.397 (1970). Figures for
1970–1971 come STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1972, supra note 246, at 264 tbl.432. Figures for
1972–1973 come from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1974, at 322 tbl.523 (1974).
250. Theodore J. Koontz, A Public Policy Case for Permitting Selective Conscientious Objection, 3 PUB. AFF. Q. 49, 71 n.17 (1989) (citing WAR RESISTERS’ INT’L, CONSCRIPTION: A
WORLD SURVEY; COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE AND RESISTANCE TO IT 59 (Devi Prasad &
Tony Smythe eds., 1968)).
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0.5% to 1.0% of British draft registrants were classified as COs. 251
While the difficulty of drawing strong conclusions from historically
singular circumstances like the situation confronting Britain in
World War II must be recognized, the British experience demonstrates at least one instance where a country that has actually permitted an exemption for SCOs did not see a flood of exemption
claims.
In sum, even with the increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam,
an extension of the exemption statute to cover conscientious objection based on non-theistic beliefs did not adversely impact the
manpower available to fight the war. Additionally, the British experience in allowing selective conscientious objection during World
War II had a negligible impact on manpower. These historical instances of broadening the conscientious objection exemption
demonstrate that the potential impact on manpower most likely
would not justify compelling combat service by SCOs.
2. Issues of Fairness
Of course, when the government drafts citizens for combat service, perceptions of fairness over the conscription system are paramount. If perceived as unfair, popular support for the draft system
may diminish to such a point that it undermines citizens’ faith in
broader government decisions, such as the decision to engage in
the conflict giving rise to the need for the draft. As expressed by
the Supreme Court in Gillette, “perhaps the central interest involved in the administration of conscription laws is the interest in
maintaining a fair system for determining ‘who serves when not
all serve.’” 252
In explaining the government’s concerns over fairness, the Court
stated that expanding the exemption to include SCOs “would involve a real danger of erratic or even discriminatory decisionmaking in administrative practice.” 253 Moreover, the Court noted:
[O]ver the realm of possible situations, opposition to a particular war
may more likely be political and nonconscientious, than otherwise. . . .
In short, it is not at all obvious in theory what sorts of objections

251. See Hochstadt, supra note 16, at 60.
252. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971) (quoting NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N
ON SELECTIVE SERV., IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? (1967)).
253. Id. at 455.
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should be deemed sufficient to excuse an objector, and there is considerable force in the Government’s contention that a program of excusing objectors to particular wars may be “impossible to conduct with
any hope of reaching fair and consistent results . . . .” 254

And so, the Court in Gillette determined that the government’s
interest in maintaining a perception of fairness in its conscription
system would be hindered by the difficult task of distinguishing
genuine conscientious objections to a particular war from bogus or
politically motivated objections. 255 The Court further determined
that it would be especially difficult to make this determination in
a consistent manner, since SCOs might present various objections
to their participation in a particular war, ranging from the purpose
of the war to the use of particular weapons or techniques in the
war to political collaboration with certain objectionable allies. 256
According to the Court, “[s]ince objection may fasten on any of an
enormous number of variables, the claim is ultimately subjective,
depending on the claimant’s view of the facts in relation to his judgment that a given factor or congeries of factors colors the character
of the war as a whole.” 257
With respect to the Court’s statement that “opposition to a particular war may more likely be political and nonconscientious, than
otherwise,” 258 it is true that a SCO must consider facts relating to
the particular conflict in a way that a GCO need not. Those facts
will, under the religious beliefs held by the SCO (such as a belief
in the just war doctrine) determine whether the conflict at issue is
one in which he may conscientiously participate or one that precludes his participation based on conscientious considerations.
This does not mean, however, that the determination of whether a

254. Id. at 455–56 (second alteration in original) (quoting Brief for the United States at
28, Gillette, 401 U.S. 437 (No. 85)).
255. Id.
256. Id. The Court in Gillette did not fully explain the administrative difficulties that it
believed would apply to selective conscientious objection, but did refer to the “Government’s
contention” that such a system would involve difficulty in reaching “fair and consistent results.” Id. at 456. In the United States’ brief in Gillette, the Government cites the broad
range of reasons mentioned above for a SCO objector to oppose participation in a particular
war and contends that “we cannot see how exemptions for selective objectors could be administered uniformly and fairly without exploration, in each case, in the matters we have
suggested.” Brief for the United States, supra note 254, at 27–28.
257. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 456.
258. Id. at 456. This statement echoes the argument made by Judge Augustus Hand in
United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). As previously explained, Judge Hand
offered no empirical support for his view that selective conscientious objection is “usually a
political objection.” Kauten, 133 F.2d at 708; see supra notes 75–89 and accompanying text.
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war is just or unjust is exclusively a political decision and not an
exercise of religion.
Under the just war doctrine, the facts relating to a particular
conflict may be characterized as “political” because they are the
result of political policies determined and implemented by the nation’s leaders, but these policies ultimately determine whether the
war is just from a religious perspective. The conclusion about a
conflict’s “justness” is an exercise of the individual’s religious sensibilities and is a matter of conscience. Under the just war theory,
the individual’s determination of whether a war is just or unjust is
an inseparable combination of contemporaneous facts and religious conclusions. The process in making this determination
should be familiar to judges and legal practitioners, since it closely
matches the common practice of applying law to findings of fact to
reach a legal conclusion. In the context of selective conscientious
objection, “political” facts are used to draw a “religious” conclusion
about the justness of a particular war. To contend that selective
conscientious objection based on the just war theory constitutes
only a political determination is comparable to characterizing a
court’s legal conclusion as factual, rather than legal, because it relies on the particular facts of the case at hand.
Thus, the statement by the Court in Gillette that selective conscientious objection “may more likely be political and nonconscientious” appears to misinterpret the well-established just war doctrine. 259 It may also constitute a narrowing of the conscientious
objection exclusion described by the Court in earlier decisions. In
Welsh, for example, the Court examined the statutory exclusion
from “religious training and belief” for “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.” 260
With respect to this exclusionary language, the Welsh Court
stated:
We certainly do not think that § 6(j)’s exclusion of those persons with
“essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code” should be read to exclude those who hold strong
beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy. 261

259. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 455.
260. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1970) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 456(j)
(Supp. I 1971–1972) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (Supp. III 2013–2016))).
261. Id. at 342 (emphasis added) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (Supp. I 1971–1972) (current
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The Court in Gillette failed to explain why a GCO may base his
objection to all wars “to a substantial extent upon considerations
of public policy,” 262 but considerations of public policy by a SCO
somehow disqualify him from the combat exemption. The SCO bases his opposition to participation in a particular war on religious
beliefs informed by factual and policy considerations. This is exactly the process described by the Court in Welsh as coming within
the section 6(j) exemption.
As to the Gillette Court’s concern that “it is not at all obvious in
theory what sorts of objections should be deemed sufficient to excuse [a SCO],” the language of RFRA provides guidance in ways
that the 1967 Act did not. 263 Under RFRA, the relevant consideration is whether government action substantially burdens an individual’s “exercise of religion.” 264 As previously explained, RFRA defines “exercise of religion” as “any exercise of religion, whether or
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 265
Moreover, Congress mandated that “exercise of religion” be construed “in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the
Constitution.” 266 Therefore, the broad scope of “exercise of religion”
as defined in RFRA appears more in line with the Court’s statements in Welsh recognizing that political factors may affect a religious determination than the statements in Gillette that selective
conscientious objection effectively amounts to a political, rather
than religious, objection.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby shows
that the Court was confident in the judiciary’s ability to distinguish
insincere claims relating to a burden on the exercise of religion
from sincere ones. In discussing legislation modeled on RFRA but
applying to “institutionalized persons,” known as the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 267
version at 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (Supp. III 2013–2016))).
262. Id.
263. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 456. Compare Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4
(2012)), with Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, sec. 7, § 6(j), 871 Stat.
100 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (Supp. III 2013–2016)).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
265. Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
266. Id. § 2000cc-3(g).
267. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5). That legislation was
enacted by Congress after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S.
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the Hobby Lobby Court stated that “Congress was confident of the
ability of the federal courts to weed out insincere claims” of religious exercise. 268 According to the Court:
RLUIPA applies to “institutionalized persons,” a category that consists primarily of prisoners, and by the time of RLUIPA’s enactment,
the propensity of some prisoners to assert claims of dubious sincerity
was well documented. Nevertheless . . . Congress enacted RLUIPA to
preserve the right of prisoners to raise religious liberty claims. If Congress thought that the federal courts were up to the job of dealing with
insincere prisoner claims, there is no reason to believe that Congress
limited RFRA’s reach out of concern for the seemingly less difficult
task of doing the same in corporate cases. 269

Similarly, if Congress believes that courts may distinguish
claims regarding prisoners’ religious beliefs between the sincere
and the insincere, there is no reason that claims by SCOs cannot
also be distinguished. As explained by the Court in Hobby Lobby,
“RFRA was designed to provide very broad protection for religious
liberty,” beyond what the Supreme Court had previously “held is
constitutionally required.” 270 Thus, given the breadth of the phrase
“exercise of religion” mandated by RFRA, it is more likely that
there will be consistent decisions about the validity of selective conscientious objection claims and less concern about the unfairness
and inconsistency than under the 1967 Act, which was in effect in
Gillette. 271

507, 536 (1997) (holding RFRA exceeds Congress’s power to regulate the states). RLUIPA
provides that
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
268. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. __, __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014).
269. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (footnote omitted).
270. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2767.
271. On the question of fairness, the Gillette Court failed to acknowledge the unfairness
created by limiting the exemption from combat to those who oppose all war. See generally
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In effect, such a limitation means that believers in the traditional “peace” churches (Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren) are exempted
from combat service, but believers of other religious faiths who might hold just as strong
religiously based beliefs about the immorality of a particular conflict are required to provide
combat service in that conflict. Because an individual could theoretically serve in good conscience in a different conflict does not mitigate the moral damage done to that individual by
requiring him to serve in combat and potentially kill others in a war that he believes, based
on religious convictions, is unjust and immoral.
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All of this is not to discount the importance of fairness in the
exemption process. It is instead to say that fairness can be achieved
through a carefully crafted process of review based on well-articulated standards, which is exactly what RFRA provides.
3. Deference to the Political Process
The final interest identified by the Court in Gillette in support
of its decision not to recognize selective conscientious objection may
be described as a political process interest. The Court explained
this interest as follows:
Opposition to a particular war . . . necessarily involves a judgment
“that is political and particular,” one “based on the same political, sociological and economic factors that the government necessarily considered” in deciding to engage in a particular conflict. . . .
Tacit at least in the Government’s view of the instant cases is the
contention that the limits of § 6(j) serve an overriding interest in protecting the integrity of democratic decisionmaking against claims to
individual noncompliance. 272

The Court further quoted the 1967 report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, which expressed the concern
that “exempting persons who dissent from a particular war, albeit
on grounds of conscience and religion in part, would ‘open the doors
to a general theory of selective disobedience to law’ and jeopardize
the binding quality of democratic decisions.” 273 Stated differently,
to allow a SCO exemption from a particular war could be viewed
as allowing each man to become “a law unto himself.” 274
Of course, allowing an exemption for GCOs already does this,
and yet, as indicated by the figures set out above, this has not resulted in any significant impact on the nation’s ability to raise an
army. Moreover, Congress has supported the proposition that religious objections should be treated differently than other types of
objections to neutral laws of general applicability. Under RFRA,
such laws must yield when they place a substantial burden on the
exercise of religion if, but only if, those laws do not support a compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive means available. In effect, RFRA does allow each man to become a law unto
272. Id. at 458 (quoting Brief for the United States, supra note 254, at 24–26).
273. Id. at 459 (quoting NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON SELECTIVE SERV., supra note 252,
at 50).
274. See supra note 180, discussing the origin of this phrase in Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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himself, but only if he can demonstrate a substantial burden on the
exercise of his religion and the government cannot justify that burden under the traditional strict scrutiny standard. General laws
must yield, but only to religious objections and only if the government cannot present a compelling interest and show that the least
restrictive means are used to achieve that interest.
Even the Gillette Court recognized that “it is not inconsistent
with orderly democratic government for individuals to be exempted
by law, on account of special characteristics, from general duties of
a burdensome nature.” 275 And yet, according to the Court in Gillette, “it is supportable for Congress to have decided that the objector to all war—to all killing in war—has a claim that is distinct
enough and intense enough to justify special status, while the objector to a particular war does not.” 276 Because RFRA does not include language comparable to the 1967 Act’s limitation only on
those who object to “war in any form,” however, this special status
for GCOs no longer finds express statutory support. As stated by
the Gillette Court, “[o]f course, we do not suggest that Congress
would have acted irrationally or unreasonably had it decided to exempt those who object to particular wars.” 277 By enacting RFRA,
Congress has done exactly that and shifted the balance toward
greater protection for the exercise of religion, including religious
theories of selective conscientious objection.
The interests supporting the decision in Gillette were characterized as “substantial” by the Court, not “compelling” as required by
RFRA. 278 That said, the Court was not necessarily looking to assess
those interests against the traditional strict scrutiny standard applicable under RFRA. Whether the concerns over manpower, fairness, and political process would constitute “compelling governmental interests,” as required by RFRA, was simply not answered
by Gillette. The issue is certainly debatable, given the historical
record showing that past decisions broadening the conscientious
objection exemption have had no practical impact on the government’s ability to raise an army. Moreover, the weight given to fairness and political process may be diminished in light of the special
275. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 460.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 462 (“The incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners’ position are
strictly justified by substantial governmental interests that relate directly to the very impacts questioned.”); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1) (2012).

HAILE AC 524 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/5/2018 1:27 PM

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

883

protection afforded to individual religious liberty through Congress’s enactment of RFRA.
As in Hobby Lobby, however, the compelling interest question
may ultimately be “unnecessary to adjudicate” in light of the second part of the government’s burden under RFRA: whether the
challenged law is “the least restrictive means of furthering [the]
compelling governmental interest.” 279 As explained below, the government may further its interests in ensuring sufficient manpower, promoting fairness, and respecting the political process
(whether these are compelling or not) through less restrictive
means than by forcing SCOs to serve in combat.
C. The Least-Restrictive-Means Analysis
As explained by the Court in Hobby Lobby, the “least-restrictivemeans standard is exceptionally demanding.” 280 It requires that
the government show “that it lacks other means of achieving its
desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise
of religion by the objecting parties.” 281 The plaintiffs in Hobby
Lobby contended that the most “straightforward” way for the government to accomplish its interest of providing the contraceptive
methods at issue to women working for employers with religious
objections to those methods would be for the government to simply
assume the cost and pay for those forms of contraceptive. 282 In the
end, however, the Court did not need to “rely on the option of a
new, government-funded program in order to conclude that the
HHS regulations [at issue] fail the least-restrictive-means test.” 283
That was because the government had “at its disposal an approach
that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs.” 284 Specifically, the
government had “already established an accommodation for nonprofit organizations with religious objections.” 285

279. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(2).
280. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at __, __, 134 S. Ct. at 2751, 2780 (2014).
281. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (“[R]equiring the
Government to ‘demonstrat[e] that application of [a substantial] burden to the person . . . is
the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.”) (alterations
in original)).
282. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
283. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2781–82.
284. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
285. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
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Under the accommodation mentioned by the Court:
[T]he [non-profit] organization can self-certify that it opposes providing coverage for particular contraceptive services.[ 286] If the organization makes such a certification, the organization’s insurance issuer
or third-party administrator must “[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive
coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the group health plan” and “[p]rovide separate payments
for any contraceptive services required to be covered” without imposing “any cost-sharing requirements . . . on the eligible organization,
the group health plan, or plan participants or beneficiaries.” 287

The Hobby Lobby Court concluded that this alternative system
of providing contraceptive coverage to employees of non-profit organizations with religious objections to the mandated forms of contraceptives could be expanded to also cover for-profit organizations
with religious-based objections to certain forms of contraceptives
mandated under the ACA. 288 Because an alternative system for ensuring access to contraceptive care already existed, burdening the
religious beliefs of for-profit employers by requiring them to provide objectionable contraceptive care violated RFRA.
In the same way, an alternative system for handling SCOs, rather than requiring them to fight and possibly kill in a war they
find immoral, already exists. As explained above, since World War
I, every draft act has allowed for COs to serve in noncombatant
roles. 289 Starting in World War II, those who objected to combat

286. It is interesting to note that the Court in Hobby Lobby did not fear a flood of false
religious objection claims to the contraceptive mandate despite the ability of organizations
under the applicable regulations to self-certify their objection to certain forms of contraceptive coverage. The lack of religious objection claims after Hobby Lobby confirms the perspective taken by the Court. As shown above, worries over “opening the floodgates” to false conscientious objection claims also did not materialize after the Court expanded the combat
exemption under Seeger and Welsh. Perhaps the lesson to draw from these experiences is
that people (and organizations) generally do not fake religious beliefs, even if it might prove
expedient or in their self-interest to do so.
287. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations
in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2013); then quoting 26
C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(a)(4), (b) (2015)).
288. See id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 & n.38.
289. See supra Part I.B. Even before World War I, COs could avoid combat service by
either paying a fee or finding a substitute. For example, section 13 of the Conscription Act
of 1863 stated:
That any person drafted and notified to appear as aforesaid, may, on or before
the day fixed for his appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his
place in the draft; or he may pay to such person as the Secretary of War may
authorize to receive it, such sum, not exceeding three hundred dollars, as the
Secretary may determine, for the procuration of such substitute . . . and thereupon such person so furnishing the substitute, or paying the money, shall be
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service were assigned to “noncombatant service as defined by the
President,” while registrants who objected to any form of military
service, even noncombatant, were instead assigned to “work of national importance under civilian direction.” 290 As the tables in Part
III.B.1 above indicate, this system of assigning COs to either noncombat service or alternative service of “national importance” has
had no material impact on the size of the fighting force and has
allowed for a workable balance between governmental interests
and individual religious freedom. SCOs could proceed through the
same well-developed procedure used for GCOs to determine that
the basis for their objection falls within the scope of RFRA’s protection as a genuine exercise of religion.
Therefore, the government’s interests in raising an army in a
fair manner while respecting the religious sensibilities of SCOs
may be achieved through a means much less onerous than forced
conscription for combat. Simply stated, allowing SCOs to serve as
noncombatants or to perform alternative service of “national importance” instead of combat service achieves the government’s
goals without subjecting SCOs to the extreme burden of potentially
being forced to kill in violation of their religious scruples. The existence of a system for noncombat or alternative service parallels
the existence of an alternative contraceptive-funding system in
Hobby Lobby, and should result in the same conclusion: that the
law at issue burdens the exercise of religion in a manner unnecessary to achieve the government’s goals.
For this reason, should the issue arise, a court should find that
RFRA offers an exemption from combat service for SCOs.
CONCLUSION
The different treatment of SCOs and GCOs has rested on faulty
premises for over forty years. There is no evidence that allowing a
combat exemption for SCOs will result in a flood of false CO claims.
discharged from further liability under that draft.
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 731, 733.
290. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885,
889. Men assigned to “work of national importance” based on their religious objection to
World War II were commonly sent to former Civilian Conservation Corps (“CCC”) camps
where they continued work on soil conservation and reforestation that had been started by
the CCC. See NAT’L SERV. BD. FOR RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS, CONGRESS LOOKS AT THE
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR 43 (1943) (statement of Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on Dec. 11, 1941).
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In addition, the view that SCOs are more likely to base their objections on political rather than religious considerations fails to appreciate the necessary interplay between political facts and religious conclusions as illustrated by the just war doctrine. That
interplay, however, does not render the just war doctrine any less
of an exercise of religion.
The conscientious objection exemption has been expanded consistently from the Civil War until the Supreme Court’s Gillette decision in 1971. Through RFRA, Congress has reasserted the primacy of religious liberty, and it appears that SCOs may finally
receive protection from being forced into combat service in violation of their religious beliefs.

